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dating violence is widespread today. Women are most likely to experience

abuse between the ages of

16 and 24.' Approximately one- out-of-every-three

teenagers report having been subjected to or threatened with physical or sexual abuse in an intimate relationship.2 Of teens 6o percent know a teen who is being
abused by an intimate partner.3
Despite the pervasiveness of violence in teen relationships, civil protection- order
statutes-the primary source of civil legal protections from abuse for adults in the fifty
states and the District of Columbia-largely ignore teens.4 The accessibility of protection orders for teens depends primarily on the scope of their rights to standing and
legal capacity to pursue claims for protection.5 The concepts of standing and capacity
often are conflated in statutes and case law, but they involve two distinct inquiries.
Standing entails whether an individual has the right to seek legal relief as a party-at
all-under a particular cause of action, whereas legal capacity prescribes whether a
party has the right to represent the party's own interests in court proceedings.' Because states largely fail to detail expressly the circumstances under which teens are
accorded standing to seek protection orders and legal capacity to represent their own
interests in related court proceedings, the accessibility of protection orders for teens
in most states remains in flux.7

'See Callie Marie Rennison, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, Intimate Partner Violence and Age of Victim,
1993-99, at 1, 3 (Nov. 28, 2001), http://bit.ly/u4cY8H.
2

See TRU, Teen Dating Abuse Report 2009: Impact of the Economy and Parent/Teen Dialogue on Dating Relationships and
Abuse 12 (June 2009), http://bit.ly/tCDJNB.
3

Id. at 13.

4

See Stacy Brustin, Legal Responses to Teen Dating Violence, 29 FAMILYLAW
QUARTERLY
331, 339 (1995); Roger J.R. Levesque,
ANDTHELAW339, 342 (1997).
JOURNAL
OFSOCIAL
POLICY
Dating Violence, Adolescents, and the Law, 4 VIRGINIA
'For a detailed analysis of the accessibility of protection orders for teens across the fifty states and the District of Columbia,
UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
see my What's Love Got to Do with It: Securing Access to Justice for Abused Teens, 61 CATHOLIC
(forthcoming 2012).
6

235, 1536 (9th ed. 2009).
BLACK's
LAWDICTIONARY

'See my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5.
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Ambiguity Harmful to Teens
In theory the silence and the ambiguity
with regard to teens' rights to standing and
legal capacity in most protection- order
statutes are somewhat positive since they
prompt teens to argue that they are entitled to pursue the remedy on their own
terms-an option they would not have were
the statutory language expressly to deny
them relief. In practice, ambiguity operates to exclude teens from the protectionorder remedy and contributes to their vulnerabilityto continued abuse.
Ambiguity in protection- order statutes
harms teens because courts often are reluctant to proceed when confronted with
cases involving child parties. Courts' reticence when presented with child parties is
a product of the law's treatment of children
generally. As a whole, the law says little
about children, and much of what it does
say about children is aimed at protecting
them in light of their immaturity and inexperience.t A prime example is the law's
creation of minority status, a legal disability imposed upon children to protect their
interests, which, among other results,
renders them incapable of entering into
many binding legal arrangements. 9 The
protectionist instinct that informs much
of the law regarding children encourages
judges and clerks to proceed with caution
when presented with claims asserted by
children, including teens. Protectionist
instincts deny teens access to justice by
encouraging courts to conclude as a default position that teens lack standing and
legal capacity where the law is unclear.
The experience of the District of Columbia is illustrative. Before 2oo9, the
District's Intrafamily Offenses Act was
ambiguous regarding whether and under

what circumstances minors had standing
and capacity to seek protection orders.o
During this time teens who sought to file
petitions for protection orders without
an adult representative often were turned
away from the courthouse unless they had
counsel, based on the assumption that
teens were not entitled to seek relief on
their own." The recognition of the unevenness of access to justice afforded to
abused teens persuaded the D.C. Council
to amend the statute to articulate explicitly the scope of minor petitioners' rights
to standing and legal capacity. After the
amendments took effect in 2oo9, the
court's default response to minor petitioners inverted: the court now assumes
that teens are entitled to seek protection
orders and routinely permits them to do
so independently.!
As the experience of the District of Columbia demonstrates, law reforms are
needed in most jurisdictions to guarantee abused teens the same civil legal protections extended to adults." But how can
teens obtain protection in the interim?
In many jurisdictions, established legal
principles and policy arguments support
extending rights to standing and legal capacity to teens to seek protection orders
under statutes that remain unclear. Here
I introduce interim strategies that often
enabled teens represented by lawyers to
secure protection under D.C.'s formerly
ambiguous statute.

Arguments for the Extension of
Standing to Minors
To initiate any legal claim, a party must
demonstrate that the party has standing, the right to seek legal relief. 4 Protection-order statutes often condition

'See DONALD
T. KRAMER,
THELEGAL
RIGHTS
OFCHILDREN
§ 1:5 (2d ed. 1994).
'BLACK'sLAw DICTIONARY
70

"D.C.

CODE§§

(9th ed. 2009).

16-1001(1), (5), 16-1003 (2001) (permitting "any person" to file petition).

"See Hearing on Bill 17-55, The "Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2007," Before the Committee on Public Safety and the
Judiciary Councilofthe District of Columbia 22-23 (2007) (statement of Karen Cunningham, Director of Legal Services for
Women Empowered Against Violence).
121nterview with Elisabeth Olds, Coexecutive Director of Survivors and Advocates for Empowerment, in Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 25, 2010).

"For a more detailed discussion of legislative reforms needed to make civil protection-order statutes effective in protecting
teens and proposed legislative language, see my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5.
4

1 BLACK'5LAw DICTIONARY
1536 (9th ed. 2009).
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standing on the relationship between the
parties and the nature of the conduct alleged to have been committed against the
petitioner. Protection- order statutes often fail to articulate whether and to what
extent standing is conditioned on age.15
Although such statutes may appear to extend standing equally to all individuals
regardless of age, they often are interpreted, in practice, to grant relief only to
adults. Nonetheless several established
legal principles and policy arguments
support extending standing to teens to
seek protection orders where there is no
evidence of a legislative intent to restrict
teens' access to this remedy.16
The Principle of Liberal Construction.
As remedial statutes, protection- order
statutes should be liberally construed to
benefit persons subjected to domestic violence.17 To advance this end, courts must
interpret ambiguities in protection- order
statutes to maximize the protections they
offer." Because protection-order statutes cannot benefit abused teens if they
do not extend standing to minors, the
principle of liberal construction supports
interpreting ambiguous statutes to grant
standing to all individuals without regard
to age.

Presumption that Minors Have Rights.
As a general matter under state and federal law, teens enjoy the same individual
rights and means of legal redress to enforce those rights as adults.'9 Although
states may impose greater restrictions on
minors' rights in the service of state interests, the law assumes, where they have not
clearly done so, that minors are accorded
the same rights as adults.-o By outlining
the procedures to be followed in cases involving parties, such as minors, who lack
legal capacity, statutes and court rules in
nearly every state and the District of Columbia presume that minors are entitled
to pursue claims for legal relief in court."
Several states go further and explicitly preserve minors' rights to access the
courts in their constitutions or codes.In short, nearly all states contemplate
and several states explicitly guarantee that
minors may access the courts to vindicate their legal rights. As a result, courts
should not read standing restrictions into
protection- order statutes that do not expressly limit access to the remedy by age.
Instilling Public Confidence in the Legal System. Granting standing to minors
to seek protection orders advances states'
interests in instilling the public's confi-

"For a detailed analysis of standing provisions in protection-order statutes and their impact on teens, see my What's Love
Got to Do with It, supra note 5.
6
The highest courts in at least two states have also determined that protection-order statutes extend standing to at least
some minors based simply on principles of statutory interpretation (see Hefel v Thompson, 577 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1998);
Beermann v Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868 (S.D. 1997)).

"See, e.g., W. VA. CODEANN. § 48-27-101(b) (LexisNexis through 2011 Reg. Sess); Cruz-Foster v Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 929
(D.C. 1991); Pechovnik v Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 98-99 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Frisk v Frisk, 719 N.W.2d 332, 335
(N.D. 2006); Raynes v Rogers, 955 A.2d 1135, 1140 (Vt. 2008).
"See Katharine B.T. v Jackson, 640 S.E.2d 569, 575-76 (W. Va. 2006) (interpreting state's protection-order statute to
extend standing to minors based in part on legislature's directive that courts should liberally construe its provisions).
"See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults,
are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."); Sorenson v Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907, 912 (Mass.
1975) ("Children enjoy the same right to protection and to legal redress for wrongs done them" as do adults.); see also
Petersen v Cityand CountyofHonolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Haw. 1969); Wilbon v D.F BastCompany, 382 N.E.2d 784,
790-91 (111.
1978); Norris v Mingle, 29 N.E.2d 400, 402 (Ind. 1940); Dunlap v Dunlap, 150 A. 905 (N.H. 1930); Gillette
v Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railway Company, 102 A. 673 (N.J. 1917); Henry v.City of New York, 724 N.E.2d
372, 374 (N.Y. 1999); Hunter v North Mason High School, 529 P.2d 898, 899 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Lee v Comer, 224
S.E.2d 721, 722-23 (W. Va. 1976).
0

Some examples of U.S. Supreme Court cases upholding state restrictions on minors' constitutional rights include New
Jersey v TL.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Bellotti v Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); McKeiver v Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971);
Ginsberg v New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
2

21

5ee Sara Jeruss, Empty Promises? How State Procedural Rules Block LGBT Minors from Vindicating Their Substantive
Rights, 43 UNIVERSITY
OFSANFRANCISCo
LAWREVIEw
853, 872-73, 905-9 (2009); Alison M. Brumley, Comment, Parental Control
of a Minor's Right to Sue in Federal Court, 58 UNIVERSITY
OFCHICAGO
LAw REVIEw333, 356 (1991).
"See Jeruss, supra note 21, at 905-9.
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dence in the legal system and reducing
intimate partner violence. Teens may be
reluctant to seek assistance from the legal system in general because they view
it as intimidating, ineffective, racist, or
unsupportive., Their views may be reinforced if they are refused access to the
courts: "Denying a teen-aged litigant access to our courts simply because he happens to be a minor ... tends to lessen the

confidence of young people in our legal
system."24 Solidifying the confidence of
abused teens in the legal system should
be particularly important to states. Teens
often do not disclose abuse to anyone, especially to adults. 5 Consequently a teen's
attempt to seek a protection order from
the legal system may present the first
opportunity for intervention in an abusive teen relationship. If a teen is turned
away from the courthouse when the teen
comes forward to seek help, the teen may
be discouraged from further disclosure
and remain at risk of further violence.
For all of these reasons, extending standing to teens to seek protection orders
promotes the public welfare by instilling
confidence in the legal system and providing opportunities for intervention in
abusive teen relationships.

Legal Capacity
The accessibility of the protection order remedy to teens depends not only
on whether teens have standing to pursue the remedy at all but also on whether

they have the legal capacity to represent
themselves in related court proceedings.
Minors generally lack the capacity to take
civil legal action."' Courts often appoint
a parent, guardian, or other adult to represent a minor party's interests in litigation.27 Perhaps because minors so rarely
appear before courts as parties without
adult representatives, courts often assume that they are prohibited from adjudicating claims brought by minors who
desire to represent their own interests.
Although some states mandate the appointment of adults to represent the interests of minor parties in all legal proceedings, many states take a much more
flexible approach.2a
With the exception of a few progressive
jurisdictions, protection- order statutes
largely fail to deal with the extent to which
teens have the legal capacity to pursue
protection-order claims.29 At the same
time some of these same jurisdictions impose additional impediments to relief not
faced by adults. For example, provisions
in California, the District of Columbia,
and Tennessee require courts to assess
whether a teen's parent should be notified
of protection- order proceedings initiated by the teen without parental involvement." These provisions direct courts to
evaluate whether permitting a teen to seek
a protection order without parental involvement serves a teen's best interests;
yet none guides courts on how to make
such determinations.' All of these ambi-

2

Focus Group by Women Empowered Against Violence with Teens, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 2005 &Jan. 2006) (in my
files).
24

Buckholz v Leveille, 194 N.W.2d 427, 427 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).

25

Amy Karan & Lisa Keating, Obsessive Teenage Love: The Precursor to Domestic Violence, 46 JUDGES'
JOURNAL,
Summer
2007, at 23, 24; see also my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5, for a detailed discussion of why teens rarely
disclose abuse.
262THOMAs
A. JACOBS,
CHILDREN
ANDTHE
LAw: RIGHTS
ANDOBLIGATONS
§ 11:13 (2011).
274

JAMES
WILLIAM
MOORE
ETAL.,MOORE's
FEDERAL
PRACTICE
1117.21[3][a] (3d ed. 2011).

28

See Jeruss, supra note 21; see also my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5, for a detailed analysis of the
treatment of legal capacity in protection-order statutes in the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
29

5ee, e.g., CAL.
CIV.PROC.
CODE
§ 372(b)(1)(C-(D) (West 2004) (according minors 12 and older legal capacity to appear in
court without adult representative); CAL.
FAM.CODE
§ 6301(a) (West 2004 &Supp. 2011); D.C. CODE§ 16-1003(a)(2) (2011)
STAT.
ANN.§ 173-B:3(ll)(b) (2010)
(permitting minors over 12 to seek protection orders without adult representative); N.H. REv.
("A minor plaintiff need not be accompanied by a parent or guardian to receive relief .... "); WASH.REV.
CODE
§ 26.50.020(2)
(a) (2011) (indicating that minors who are at least 16 do not need guardian or next friend to pursue order for protection).
CODE
§ 372(b)(2)
"oSee CAL.Civ. PROC.
ANN.§ 36-3-602(b) (2010).
3

CODE
§ 16-1004(e) (Supp. 2011); see also TENN.
(West 2004 & Supp. 2011); D.C. CODE

See sources cited supra note 30.
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guities heighten the challenges involved
in counseling teens on the likely consequences of pursuing the protectionorder remedy since it leaves advocates
unable to predict with certainty whether
a teen's parents will be notified of or required to be involved in the proceedings.

Enabling Minors to Protect Their
Health, Safety, and Welfare. Granting
minors the legal capacity to represent
themselves in protection-order proceedings is consistent with state policies
that authorize minors to make autonomous decisions about matters affecting
their health, well-being, and safety in
other contexts. "Mature minor" statutes
Arguments for Extending Legal
in many states permit minors to conCapacity to Minors and Overriding
sent, without parent involvement or noParent Notification Mandates
tification, to emergency and outpatient
Statutes that require teens to pursue medical care, testing and treatment for
claims for protection orders through adult sexually transmitted diseases, substance
representatives or require courts to notify abuse treatment, outpatient mental
parents if teens initiate protection- order health services, and reproductive health
claims independently deter teens from care.'5 States have also accorded minors
seeking legal relief because teens are of- the legal capacity to make decisions about
ten unwilling to disclose abuse to adults 1 the health, well-being, and safety of their
Several legal principles and policy argu- own children without adult involvement.
ments support courts extending legal ca- To this end, minors have been granted the
pacity to teens to represent themselves in right to consent to the adoption of a child,
protection- order proceedings where state pursue legal claims for child support and
laws do not mandate the involvement of custody, and apply for government benan adult representative.
efits such as Medicaid and Temporary
Assistance
for Needy Families." By enactLiberal Construction Revisited and
ing
these
policies,
states have prioritized
Applied to Capacity. As in the context
encouraging
minors
to avail themselves of
of standing, the principle of liberal conservices
crucial
to
their
health, safety, and
struction supports interpreting ambiguwell-being
over
preserving
parent control
ous protection-order statutes to confer
over adolescent decision making.
capacity on teen petitioners to represent themselves in court proceedings."
Courts' Discretion to Permit Minors
Protection-order statutes best protect to Represent Themselves: Rule 17(c).
teens subjected to abuse if such statutes Statutes and court rules governing legal
accord teens legal capacity because teens capacity in more than half of states grant
are more likely to seek protection orders courts the discretion to permit a miif they are not required to involve their nor party to pursue legal claims without
parents in related proceedings.34
an adult representative.A Twenty-four

32

5ee Kristine Herman, Center for Court Innovation, Youth Dating Violence: Can a Court Help Break the Cycle? 5 (2004);
see also Karan & Keating, supra note 25; see my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5.
33

5ee note 17, supra, and accompanying text.

34

But see Katherine B.T, 640 S.E.2d at 577 (declining to conclude that principle of liberal construction supports interpreting
state's rules regarding legal capacity, including rule derived from Federal Rule 17(c), to permit minors to proceed without
adult representatives in protection-order cases).
"See Heather Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, Minors and the Right to Consent to Health Care,

GUTTMACHER
REPORT
ONPUBLIC

POLICY,
Aug. 2000, at 4-5.

"See D.C. CODE§ 16-914(a-3) (granting minor parents right to initiate custody proceedings); KRAMER,
supra note 8, § 14:2;
Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: Minors' Rights as Parents (Jan. 1, 2012), http://bit.ly/AEMWgd; Guttmacher
Institute, State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Minors' Consent Law (Jan. 1, 2012), http://bit.ly/zHqg4t; Jodie LevinEpstein &John Hutchins, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Teens and TANF: How Adolescents Fare Under the Nation's
Welfare Program (Dec. 2003), http://bit.ly/yaLUIF.
"See CONN.GEN. STAT.ANN. 545a-132(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); N.H. REv.STAT.ANN. § 464-A:41 (LexisNexis 2007);
and authorities cited infra note 38.
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states incorporate nearly verbatim the
procedures applied in cases involving
minor parties found in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17 (c)." Rule 17(c) authorizes adults who share one of several
types of relationships with minors to sue
on behalf of minor parties and directs
that courts "must appoint a guardian ad
litem-or issue another appropriate order-to protect a minor ... who is unrep-

resented in an action."'9 Although Rule
17(c) is often characterized as mandating
the appointment of adult representatives
for minor parties, courts repeatedly have
interpreted Rule 17(c) to afford judges
the discretion to proceed without the appointment of a representative so long as
the minor's interests are adequately protected. 40
The "Bellotti" Test as a Model for Evaluating Minors' Interests. Although the
jurisprudence analyzing Rule 17(c) does
not concern how courts should evaluate whether a minor party's interests
are adequately protected without an
adult representative, the jurisprudence
on whether pregnant minors should be
permitted to bypass parent notification
requirements of state abortion statutes is a useful model. 4' As articulated
in Bellotti v. Baird, courts must exempt
pregnant minors from parent notification requirements if such minors demonstrate maturity or if that bypass serves

their best interests.4 2 Likewise, courts
should conclude that minor petitioners' interests are adequately protected
in protection-order cases where minor
petitioners demonstrate maturity or that
representing themselves serves their
best interests.
EvaluatingMaturity. In many cases a minor petitioner's autonomous decision to
seek a civil protection order, itself, will
demonstrate the minor's good judgment
and maturity.43 Minors might also demonstrate their maturity through their demeanor, including their analytic ability,
thoughtfulness, and ability to articulate
their reasons for seeking court protection; life experience, including their
educational background, management of
personal finances, experience with living
away from home, and employment; perspective, including their ability to understand and weigh the consequences of
the options available to them; and judgment. 44
Weighing Minors' Best Interests. Minors'
interest in safety should be paramount
when a court weighs whether permitting
minor petitioners to represent themselves in protection-order proceedings
serves their best interests. 45 As the Supreme Court of South Dakota reflected
when assessing whether to appoint an
adult representative for a minor petitioner in protection-order proceedings,

GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-11-17(c) (2006); KAN.
STAT.
ANN. § 60-217(c) (2005); OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 12, § 2017(c) (West 2010);
S.D. CoDI LAws § 15-6-17(c) (2011); ALA.R.Civ. P.17(c); AASKA R.Civ. P.17(c); ARIZ.R.Civ. P.17(g); CoLo. R.CIv. P.17(c);
DEL.SUPER.
CT.R.Civ. P.17(c); FLA.R.Cry. P 1.210(b); HAW.
R.Civ. P.17(c); IDAHOR.Civ. P.17(c); ME. R.Cw. P.17(b); MASS.R.
Civ. P.17(b); Miss. R.Cv. P.17(c); MoNT. R.Civ. P.17(c); NEv. R.Civ. P.17(c); N.M. DIST.
CT.R.Civ. P.1-017(c); N.D. R.Civ.
P.17(b); OHio R.CIv. P.17(B); S.C. R.Cv. P.17(c); TENN.CT.R.ANN. 17.03; Vr. R.Civ. P 17(b); Wyo. R.Civ. P.17(c); see also
Jeruss, supra note 21, at 875-78, 905-10.

'See

"FED.R.Civ. P.17(cX2).
40See, e.g., Gardner v Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 1989); M.S. v Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 174 (8th Cir. 1977);

Roberts v Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958).
41The few cases on this issue hold that a minor party's interests were adequately protected without an appointed guardian
because another adult accompanied the minor to court proceedings (see, e.g., Cowden v Ramsay (In re Cowden), 154

B.R. 531, 535 (Bankr. D. Ark. 1993)). See also Brumley, supra note 21, at 348-55, for a related argument that courts
should apply the Bellotti test to determine whether a minor should have a right to sue over parental objection on an issue
normally reserved to parental discretion.
4Belotti

43See

v Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979).

In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d 791, 793 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).

44See, e.g., H.B. v Wilkinson, 639 F.Supp. 952, 954 (D. Utah 1986); Ex Parte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (Ala.

2001); In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d at 792; In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 290-91 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); In re Doe, 973 So. 2d
548, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Tex. 2000).
4S5ee, e.g., In re Doe 2, 166 P.3d 293, 296 (Colo. App. 2007); In re Doe, 866 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); In re

Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. 2000).
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"[wle are not convinced that the need for
a guardian at the petition stage outweighs
the need for immediate court protection.... In the middle of domestic strife,
preserving the mental and emotional
health of the vulnerable must override
other less compelling interests."46 Particularly if minor petitioners choose not
to seek a protection order if a parent or
another adult must participate in the litigation, permitting minor petitioners to
represent themselves nearly always advances their interests in safety. Courts
weighing a minor petitioner's best interests also might consider the extent
to which requiring adult representation
could disrupt the minor petitioner's
home life.4 7
"Bellotti" and Parent Notification.
The Bellotti jurisprudence also is a useful framework for courts in states that
grant legal capacity to minors but require
courts to decide whether to notify parents that their minor children have initiated protection- order proceedings.4t In
California and the District of Columbia,
for example, minors aged 12 and older
have the capacity to represent themselves
in protection- order proceedings under
certain circumstances, but when minors
initiate such cases, courts must notify a
parent unless the court determines that
notification would impair the minor
petitioner's best interests.49 Just as with
assessments of whether minor petitioners' interests are adequately protected if
they represent themselves, court determinations of whether parent notification
will harm a minor petitioner's interests
should focus principally on safety.o Jf
notifying a parent risks causing a minor
petitioner to abandon a claim for a protection order, forgoing parent notification will nearly always advance the minor's interest in safety.

Advocacy Road Map
The legal protections available under
civil protection- order statutes are as
critical to abused teens as they are to
adults.1 Yet the widespread ambiguities
in protection- order statutes with regard
to teens' rights to standing and legal capacity often prevent teens from accessing this remedy. I have offered strategies
that advocates have successfully pursued
to secure protection orders for teens under ambiguous statutes. Because the effectiveness of the arguments suggested
varies with jurisdiction, advocates assisting teens in seeking civil protection
orders under ambiguous statutes might
consider the following questions about
the laws in their jurisdictions to implement the strategies proposed above:

Standing
* Does the protection-order statute refer
to age when defining who is eligible to
seek a protection order?
* Does the protection- order statute explicitly limit protection orders to adults
or minors over a certain age?
* Is there case law or legislative history
recognizing the protection- order statute as remedial or emphasizing the
principle of liberal construction?
* Is there case law recognizing that minors
enjoy legal rights, just as adults?
* Is the right to access the courts to seek
legal relief guaranteed to minors by
constitutional provision, statute, or case
law?
" Does the jurisdiction have a statute or
court rule designating the procedures to
be implemented in cases involving par-

46

Beermann, 559 N.W.2d at 871 (internal citations omitted).

47

See sources cited supra note 45.

'For a detailed analysis of parent notification provisions in protection-order statutes, see my What's Love Got to Do with
It, supra note 5.
49

CAL.Civ. PROC.
CODE
§ 372 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.);
2011 Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE§§ 16-1003(a), 1004(e) (Supp. 2011).

CAL.FAM. CODE§ 6301

(West, Westlaw through

"oSee supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
"See my What's Love Got to Do with It, supra note 5, for a detailed discussion of the benefits of the protection-order
remedy to teens.
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ties lacking legal capacity (thereby implying that they have standing)?
E Is there case law recognizing the state's
interests in instilling public confidence in the legal system?

Legal Capacity
a Does the protection-order statute articulate the procedures to be followed
when a minor petitioner seeks a protection order?
m Does the protection-order statute specifically articulate whether a minor petitioner is authorized to file a petition
for a protection order or participate in
related court proceedings without an
adult representative?
m Is there case law or legislative history
recognizing the protection- order statute as remedial or emphasizing the
principle of liberal construction?

m Are there statutes or regulations granting minors the right to consent without
parent involvement to matters affecting their health, safety, or welfare, such
as emergency medical care, testing or
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, or reproductive health care?
m Does the statute or court rule on legal
capacity in civil matters follow Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)? That is,
does the statute or rule permit courts
to appoint an adult representative for a
minor party or issue another appropriate order?
" If the jurisdiction grants courts the
discretion to determine whether to appoint an adult representative for minor
parties, what factors demonstrate that
minors are sufficiently mature to represent their own interests in the litigation,
or that permitting minors to represent
themselves serves their best interests
regardless of their maturity level?
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